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NOTES
A DOUBLE STANDARD OF OBSCENITY: THE GINSBERG
DECISION
INTRODUCTION
The basic constitutional view of obscenity has undergone a subtle
transformation as the result of several recent Supreme Court decisions,
culminating in Ginsberg v. New York.1 Throughout these decisions,
the underlying problem concerning the issue of obscenity has not been
whether obscenity is constitutionally protected, for obscene material has
long been deemed to fall outside the protection afforded by the First
Amendment.2  The difficulty has been, rather, in determining
what actually constitutes obscene material. Traditionally, the criterion for
determining obscenity has been based on the effect such material would
have on members of society.' An inherent difficulty in such an approach
lies in deciding what members of society are to be considered in determin-
ing the effect of the literature. Should the standard be geared to minors,
who are generally very impressionable, or should the adult mind constitute
the indicia? A second difficulty encountered in the obscenity cases is the
insistence by many that obscenity is an inherent characteristic, rather
than a variable to be classified according to the type of people who read the
questioned material.4
Throughout the attempt to determine a sufficient definitional basis
for obscenity, a conflict has also existed between the freedom of expres-
sion guaranteed by the Constitution and the state's desire to protect its
more impressionable younger citizens from the effects of questionable
material. Initially, literature could be declared obscene if the Court felt it
aroused the sexual interests of the young and immature.5 Such rulings
relegated adults to reading only that literature deemed suitable for
children. Later decisions, however, swung to the opposite end of the
spectrum and set forth the standard of obscenity as embracing only that
material which would appeal to the "prurient interest" of an average
adult.'
1. Ginsberg v. New York, 88 S. Ct. 1274 (1968).
2. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
3. See notes 8-34 infra and accompanying text.
4. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 366 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1966).
5. Regina v. Hicklin, L.R.3 Q.B. 360 (1868).
6. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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The most pragmatic approach to solving the conflicts discussed above
seems to have been enunciated in Ginsberg v. New York.' In the
Ginsberg case, the Supreme Court upheld a New York statute which set
forth a separate test for obscenity in regard to minors. The statute
determined that certain literature could be declared obscene only as it
related to minors. The adult standard was not set forth in the statute, but
rather was to be determined by prevailing Supreme Court decisions.
It is the purpose of this note to review the various obscenity stand-
ards and to analyze the evolution of the law, with special emphasis on its
relation to minors, to its present status as set forth in Ginsberg v. New
York.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF RECENT OBSCENITY LAW
The Beginning of Obscenity Standards
The first recognized approach to defining an obscenity standard is
found in the English case of Regina v. Hicklin.8 The Hicklin case
enunciated a test based upon the effect literature would have upon the
most susceptible of potential recipients.' The court stated:
[T]he test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the
matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those
whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into
whose hands a publication may fall."0
A necessary inference from such a statement is that the question involved
in applying this method of determining obscenity status is whether the
material tends to incite anyone" who may read it.
The Hicklin doctrine was initially accepted in the United States in
United States v. Bennett." Subsequent decisions, however, tended to
reject the Hicklin test." Thus the court in the United States v. Levine,4
a prosecution for sending obscene material through the mails, rejected a
jury instruction to the effect that the statute in question was designed to
protect the young and immature and thus the jury should consider the
effect of such material on a child's mind rather than its effect on a mature
person. 5
7. 88 S. Ct. 1274 (1968).
8. Regina v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. (1868).
9. Id. at 371.
10. Id.
11. Emphasis added.
12. United States v. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. 1093 (No. 14571) (S.D.N.Y. 1879).
13. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) ; United States v. Levine, 83
F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1936).
14. United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1936).
15. Id.
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Problems involving contemporary obscenity statutes protecting min-
ors came into sharp focus in Butler v. Michigan." In that case the Court
reversed defendant's conviction under a state statute which prohibited
the sale of any book which would sexually excite minors." The rejected
statute was analagous to the Hicklin approach. In dismissing the action,
the Court stated that although a state's motives in attempting to protect
its youth were meritorious and within the state's powers, a statute re-
stricting the reading material of all was not reasonably restricted to the
evil toward which the statute was directed.'" The Court said that:
"Surely, this is to burn the house to roast the pig."' 9 Continuing, the
Court stated, "The incidence of this enactment is to reduce the adult
population of Michigan to reading only what is fit for children."2
Thus, Levine, Butler and other decisions marked a discernible trend
toward greater liberality in the determination of a standard of obscenity.
The Roth Test
Present obscenity law had its true inception in Roth v. United
States2' wherein the Court specifically rejected the Hicklin test by
stating:
The Hicklin test, judging obscenity by the effect of isolated
passages upon the most susceptible persons, might well encom-
pass material legitimately treating with sex, and so it must be
rejected as unconstitutionally restrictive of the freedoms of
speech and press.22
The test in Roth is also, by its terms, an a priori rejection of the
16. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
17. Id. at 381. The statute (declared unconstitutional) read as follows:
Any person who shall import, print, publish, sell, possess with the intent to sell,
design, prepare, loan, give away, distribute or offer for sale, any book,
magazine, newspaper, writing, pamphlet, ballad, printed paper, print, picture
drawing, photograph, publication or other thing, including any recordings,
containing obscene, immoral, lewd or lascivious language, or obscene, immoral,
lewd or lascivious prints, pictures, figures, or descriptions, tending to incite
minors to violent or depraved or immoral acts, manifestly tending to the
corruption of the morals of youth, or shall introduce into any family, school
or place of education or shall buy, procure, receive or have in his possession,
any such book, pamphlet, magazine, newspaper, writing, ballad, printed paper,
print, picture, drawing, photograph, publication or other thing, either for the
purpose of sale, exhibition, loan or circulation, or with intent to introduce
the same into any family, school or place of education, shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor.
Id.
18. Id. at 381.
19. Id. at 383.
20. Id.
21. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
22. Id. at 489.
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Hicklin approach. In contrast to the "most susceptible" basis, the stan-
dard used in Roth is "whether to the average person, applying con-
temporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest."" Thus, the Roth
case included two main elements in the standard it set forth: (a) the
dominant theme of the material, taken as a whole, must appeal to the
prurient interest; (b) the material must be patently offensive because it
offends contemporary community standards. The contemporary com-
munity standard involved in the case is national in scope. 4 Concerning
the national scope of the Roth test, the Court in Jacobellis v. Ohio stated
that :
It has been suggested that the "contemporary community
standards" aspect of the Roth test implies a determination of
the constitutional question of obscenity in each case by the
standards of the particular local community from which the case
arises. This is an incorrect reading of Roth.25
Indeed, to allow a state to develop its own statutory standard by which
to measure obscenity would negate the very idea of a national standard
as set out in Roth and Jacobellis.
In Memoirs v. Massachusetts,26 the Roth test was expanded to
include "utterly without redeeming social value" as a new element in the
test of obscenity. In enunciating the more liberal standard, the Court
stated :
A book cannot be proscribed unless it is found to be utterly
without redeeming social value. This is so even though the book
is found to possess the requisite prurient appeal and to be
patently offensive. Each of the three federal constitutional
criteria is to be applied independently; the social value of the
book can neither be weighed against nor canceled by its prurient
appeal or patent offensiveness.
Modifications of the Roth Test
The Roth, Butler and Memoirs decisions reflect the crest of the
degrees of protection given material under the First Amendment. These
decisions have embodied the most unrestrictive concepts enunciated to
date. Since these cases, however, several rulings handed down by the
23. Id.
24. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
25. Id.
26. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
27. Id. at 419.
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United States Supreme Court have eroded many of the small, but
important, distinctions inherent in the Roth test.
The Roth test was altered by the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Ginz-
burg.28 This case held that although publications themselves may not be
obscene, the circumstances of their sale and distribution may render
them so. 2' The fact that the purveyor's sole emphasis is on the sexually
provocative aspects of the material offered for sale may thus be deter-
minative in finding obscenity."0
The Roth test was further altered by the Supreme Court in Mishkin
v. New York."' Reasoning that the material in question was stimulating
only to a deviant group and repugnant to the average man, the appellant
asserted that the Roth test did not apply. The Court rejected this
contention. Holding the material obscene, the Court found that the
prurient appeal of the material was directed to certain deviant groups
within society and was thus objectionable on the basis that the material
was specifically aimed for distribution to such groups. 2 In adjusting
the Roth test, the Court stated:
We adjust the prurient-appeal requirement to social realities by
permitting the appeal of this type of material to be assessed
in terms of the sexual interests of its intended and probable
recipient group; and since our holding requires that recipient
group be defined with more specificity than in terms of sexually
immature persons, it also avoids the inadequacy of the most-
susceptible-person facet of the Hicklin test.3
Through these modifications, the Court indicated a willingness to
restrict the Roth test in certain instances where the demands of society
required such a restriction.
Hints of the Ginsberg Approach
Judges, both state and federal, attempted to find a means whereby
children could be protected from material which might "corrupt" or
"deprave" them. One such attempt involved "variable obscenity." The
concept of "variable obscenity," which was enunciated in Bookcase v.
28. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 470.
31. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
32. Id. An earlier district court decision also applied the prurient appeal
requirements to a narrow group. In United States v. 31 Photographs, 156 F. Supp. 350
(S.D.N.Y. 1957), the court found that material--even though it would appeal to
prurient interest of the average person-is not obscene when the only people who have
access to the material are scientists who will use it for research.
33. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 509 (1966).
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New York," defines obscenity in terms of its appeal to the group to
which the material is primarily directed." Thus, material may have an
obscene status if directed toward one group and yet be unobjectionable
when directed toward another. 6 The Court in Bookcase introduced the
"variable obscenity" concept when it stated:
The clear implication of these cases is that material which
is protected for distribution to adults is not necessarily con-
stitutionally protected from restriction upon its dissemination to
children. In other words, the concept of obscenity or of un-
protected matter may vary according to the group to whom
the questionable material is directed or from whom it is
quarantined."
The Court further enunciated the concept, saying:
It is clear that there is no such thing as "obscenity in the
air"-that is, obscene matter does not exist in a vacuum but can
be found only by reference either to the group to whom the
matter is directed or from whom it is barred."
In contrast to the variable approach to obscenity is the "constant"
approach which assumes an inherent quality in material that renders
such material either unfit for anyone or, conversely, fit for everyone. 9
Some courts have attempted to work within this framework rather than
alter the obscenity standard as set forth in the Roth test. Such an approach
would necessarily result in carving out an exception for minors. Thus,
the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana in In re Louisiana
News Companies"0 deduced that the Supreme Court might accept as
constitutional a statute directed solely at youth:
While we have no occasion here to pass on the constitutionality
of such a law, it would seem that a state might enact a valid
statute "specifically designed to protect its children" from
suggestive books and magazines that are not too rugged for
grown men and women, without at the same time burning the
house down to roast the pig by restricting everyone else to
34. Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 18 N.Y.2d 71, 218 N.E.2d 668 (Ct. App. 1966).
35. Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional
Standards, 45 MiNl. L. REv. 5, 77 (1960).
36. Id.
37. Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 18 N.Y.2d 71, 218 N.E.2d 668, 671 (Ct. App. 1966).
38. Id. at 872.
39. Lockhart & McClure, supra note 35, at 85.
40. In re Louisiana News Company, 187 F. Supp. 241 (E.D. La. 1960).
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reading such fiction as Boy's Life at the magazine stand and
the Five Little Peppers at the bookstand.4
Several Supreme Court Justices had also indicated that they would
accept a statute which limited only the reading material of minors. 2
In Jacobellis v. Ohio"3 Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Goldberg,
stated :
State and local authorities might well consider whether their
objectives in this area would be better served by laws aimed
specifically at preventing distribution of objectionable material
to children, rather than totally prohibiting its dissemination."'
Although Justices Goldberg and Brennan were the only members of the
Court to definitively express their acceptance of such a statute, three




In Ginsberg v. New York," the Supreme Court rejected
an attack on the constitutionality of a New York statute which made it
unlawful to sell material deemed "harmful to minors" to anyone under
seventeen years of age. Such material was described as follows:
Harmful to minors means that quality of any description or
representation, in whatever form, of nudity, sexual conduct,
sexual excitement, or sado-masochistic abuse, when it:
(i) predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or
morbid interest of minors, and
(ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the
adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable
material for minors, and
(iii) is utterly without redeeming social importance for
minors.48
41. Id. at 247.
42. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964). For a complete discussion see Inter-
state Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 366 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1966).
43. 378 U.S. at 184 (1964).
44. Id. at 195.
45. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 366 F.2d 590, 595 (5th Cir. 1966).
46. Ginsberg v. New York, 88 S. Ct. 1274 (1968).
47. Id.
48. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 484-h (McKinney 1967).
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Appellant, Sam Ginsberg, who operated "Sam's Stationery and
Luncheonette," was prosecuted under the New York statute for selling
two "girlie" magazines to a sixteen year old youth.49 Neither of the
magazines sold by the appellant had been classified as obscene under the
prevailing adult standard.5" The appellant's primary attack on the
statute rested upon the argument that the state did not have the power
to regulate an adult's available reading matter upon a determination that
the material was obscene, according to the statutory norm, as to minors.5'
The majority opinion, written by Justice Brennan,5" rejected this
contention. The Court held that the statute in question did not invade a
constitutionally protected area of freedom, but rather simply "adjusted"
the definition of obscenity "to social realities by permitting the appeal of
this type of material to be assessed in terms of the sexual interests ...
of such minors."5 The Court found that the state had the power to
adjust this definition in view of its right to control the conduct of
children to a greater54 extent than the conduct of adults.5 The Court
stated:
That the state has power to make that adjustment seems clear,
for we have recognized that even where there is an invasion
of protected freedoms . . . the power of the state to control the
conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority
over adults ... ..
Granting this power of the state to "infringe" on the rights of expression
in regard to distribution of material to minors, the question, then, is
whether the legislature can rationally conclude that exposure to such
material constitutes an abuse as to minors to the extent that the material
should not be constitutionally protected.57 The Court concluded that the
legislature could reasonably have found that such material is harmful
to minors. The power of the state to assume parental duties through a
statutory framework was justified by the Court thusly:
While the supervision of children's reading may best be
left to their parents, the knowledge that parental control or
guidance cannot always be provided and society's transcendent
49. Ginsberg v. New York, 88 S. Ct. 1274, 1276 (1968).
50. Id. at 1277.
51. Id. at 1278.
52. There was also a concurring opinion by Justice Stewart and a dissent by
Justices Black and Douglas.
53. 88 S. Ct. 1274 at 1279-80 (1968).
54. Emphasis added.
55. 88 S. Ct. 1274 at 1280 (1968).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1281.
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interest in protecting the welfare of children justify reasonable
regulation of the sale of material to them. It is, therefore,
altogether fitting and proper for a state to include in a statute
designed to regulate the sale of pornography to children special
standards, broader than those embodied in legislation aimed at
controlling dissemination of such material to adults."
Ginsberg's Place in the Pattern
The Supreme Court's holding in Ginsberg becomes relevant by
reason of its emphasis upon measuring materials in relation to the group
toward whom the material is directed. As a result of Ginsberg, the state
may now define or classify material as unfit for distribution to minors.
Since the Court in Ginsberg artfully avoided any reference to the
Roth test as such, it cannot be unequivocally stated that the Roth test has
been altered. However, the test as set forth by Roth and subsequent
decisions is no longer the only criterion by which New York judges may
measure the prurient appeal of questionable material, at least insofar as
their rulings relate to sales to minors. Thus, the Roth test was modified
or, as the Court says, "adjusted," to fit the social realities of the situation.
Even assuming that the Roth test was rejected as to minors, this is
not to say that the doctrine of "variable obscenity" was adopted. The
Court in Ginsberg adroitly avoided acceptance of the concept of variable
obscenity. However, the very fact that the appeal may be judged in light
of either youthful desires or adult desires, is to accept the basic tenet
of variable obscenity.
The Effects of Ginsberg
New York now has two standards by which obscenity may be
judged-the standard test applied to the sale of materials to an adult
and a more stringent one governing sales to minors. As a practical
matter, the aesthetic realities of the two tests are at great variance. As
to adults the standard is analagous to that of the United States Supreme
Court permitting free access to most modern publications. In Redrup v.
New York, 9 such magazines as Gent, Swank, Bachelor, Modern Man, Ace
and Sir were cleared of any taint of obscenity. Under the Roth
standard, pictures of nude women, including genitilia, have been found
not to be obscene. 6 Nor, the Court has held, will seductively posed nude
58. Id. This was first enunciated in People v. Kahan, 15 N.Y.2d 311, 206 N.E.2d
333 (Ct App. 1965).
59. Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
60. Id.
61. United States v. 1,000 Copies of a Magazine Entitled Solis, 254 F. Supp. 595
(D. Md. 1966).
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women appeal to the prurient interest of the average man.62
In marked contrast to the adult standard, the New York statute
makes it unlawful to sell, to anyone under seventeen years of age, any
picture which portrays nudity.6" The statute defines nudity thusly:
Nudity means the showing of the human male or female
genitals, pubic area or buttocks with less than a full opaque
covering, or the showing of the female breast with less than
a fully opaque covering of any portion thereof below the top
of the nipple, or the depiction of covered male genitals in a
discernibly turgid state.6"
The Court upheld the New York statute as valid on its face. Thus,
the Court did not deal with the obscenity of the magazines involved, nor
did it establish a constitutional basis for obscenity as to minors. By
upholding the statute on the basis of a state's police power, it would seem
that the criterion of obscenity as to minors will henceforth depend upon
the reasonableness of the state statute involved. This being so, it is
submitted that serious doubts are raised as to the establishment of a
national community standard, similar to the one involved in the Roth
test, as to minors.
Thus, at least in relation to youth, the utilization of a state standard,
based on local community mores may have the "intolerable consequence of
denying some sections of the country access to material, there deemed
acceptable, which in others might be considered offensive to prevailing
community standards of decency."6 Furthermore, the disparity between
different states as to the age group deemed "minors" will result in
children in one state not having access to material which children of
equivalent age would have in another state.
CONCLUSION
The Ginsberg decision is but one in a series of cases rejecting or
modifying the Roth test. The decision reached by the Court recognizes a
reality of life: some material is more sexually exciting to one group than
another. Unfortunately, by utilizing the police power doctrine to uphold
the statute, the Court failed to resolve the problems inherent in present
obscenity law. Nevertheless, the approach used in Ginsberg-setting a
different standard for those under the age of seventeen-is the most
pragmatic method yet devised to accomplish the interests of society in
62. Excellent Publications, Inc. v. United States, 309 F.2d 362 (1st Cir. 1962).
63. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-h, 2(b) (McKinney 1967).
64. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-h, 1 (b) (McKinney 1967).
65. Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 488 (1962).
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protecting children from material that they cannot yet deal with on a
mature level, while yet allowing the more mature segments of society
the pleasure of adult literature.
APPENDIX A
NEW YORK PENAL LAW § 484-h as enacted by L. 1965, ch. 327, pro-
vides:
§ 484-h. Exposing minors to harmful materials.
1. Definitions. As used in this section:
(a) "Minor" means any person under the age of seventeen years.
(b) "Nudity" means the showing of the human male or female
genitals, pubic area or buttocks with less than a full opaque covering, or
the showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering
of any portion thereof below the top of the nipple, or the depiction of
covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state.
(c) "Sexual conduct" means acts of masturbation, homosexuality,
sexual intercourse, or physical contact with a person's clothed or un-
clothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks or, if such person be a female, breast.
(d) "Sado-mashochistic abuse" means flagellation or torture by
or upon a person clad in undergarments, a mask or bizarre costume, or
the condition of being fettered, bound or otherwise physically restrained
on the part of one so clothed.
(f) "Harmful to minors" means that quality of any description
or representation, in whatever form, of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual
excitement, or sado-masochistic abuse, when it:
(i) predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid
interest of minors, and
(ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult
community as a whole with respect to what is suitable for
minors, and
(iii) is utterly without redeeming social importance for minors.
(g) "Knowingly" means having general knowledge of, or reason
to know, or a belief or ground for belief which warrants further inspec-
tion or inquiry of both:
(i) the character and content of any material described herein,
which is reasonably susceptible of examination by the defend-
ant, and
(ii) the age of the minor, provided however, that an honest
mistake shall constitute an excuse from liability hereunder if
the defendant made a reasonable bona fide attempt to ascertain
the true age of such minor.
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2. It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to sell or loan for
monetary consideration to a minor:
(a) any picture, photograph, drawing, sculpture, motion picture
film, or similar visual representation or image of a person or portion of
the human body which depicts nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic
abuse and which is harmful to minors, or
(b) any book, pamphlet, magazine, printed matter however re-
produced, or sound recording which contains any matter enumerated in
paragraph (a) of subdivision two hereof, or explicit and detailed verbal
descriptions or narrative accounts of sexual excitement, sexual conduct
or sado-masochistic abuse and which, taken as a whole is harmful to
minors.
3. It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to exhibit for a
monetary consideration to a minor or knowingly to sell to a minor an
admission ticket or pass or knowingly to admit a minor for a monetary
consideration to premises whereon there is exhibited a motion picture,
show or other presentation which, in whole or in part, depicts nudity,
sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse and which is harmful to minors.
4. A violation of any provision hereof shall constitute a mis-
demeanor.
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